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X OLiTiCAL science is a very trendy discipline. Few books or 
articles are cited a decade, let alone a generation, after they are 
written. When scholars die, their ideas often die with them, 
although they may be reinvented later and trumpeted as new. 
Hans Morgenthau is a rare, if partial, exception to this 
generalization. Students still read his work, especially but not 
exclusively Politics Among Nations which to a large degree made 
the field; scholars still cite his work, even if they have not read 
it recently or carefully and even if their main objective is to 
attack it; and, perhaps more importantly, there is much to be 
gained by re-reading his books and thinking about what he has 
to say. Morgenthau wrote too much for me to even attempt a 
summary, and, like any subtle and supple thinker, he voiced 
too many contradictions to permit ready distillations. As both a 
detached scholar and a passionate observer of world politics, 
Morgenthau sought to have his general philosophy guide his 
views on specific issues and yet to remain open enough to allow 
his observations of the wisdom and folly- usually the 
latter- around him alter some of his most deeply-held beliefs. 
In a world in which scholarship and public policy are 
increasingly separate, in which highest academic prestige goes 
to those who construct the most abstract and apparently 
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rigorous models, and in which a fascination with everyday 
politics, let alone the hope to improve the welfare of human- 
kind, is seen as antithetical to the attempt to discover the laws 
of politics and in which an ability to see several sides of a hotly 
contested issue is seen as an insufficient commitment o the 
correct cause, Morgenthau's approach is not a popular one. 
And yet because he had so much to say about so many timeless 
questions, scholars find it impossible to avoid him. 
Like so many scholars who formed the founding generation 
of the American study of international politics, Hans Mor- 
genthau was a refugee from the Nazis, and his European 
education and experience provided a breadth of outlook and 
an historical orientation which gave him insights, which came 
more slowly to more parochial American students, and 
simultaneously blinded him to important aspects of American 
policy, especially its domestic roots. He reserved some of his 
deepest scorn for ideas which, if not uniquely American, are 
particularly prominent in American social science and political 
thought. More specifically, he sought to tame Americans' 
optimism about human nature, science, and reform. Epito- 
mized by Woodrow Wilson, much American public opinion, 
many political leaders, and a distressingly large number of 
scholars equated good intentions with a successful foreign 
policy, assumed that democracy could control if not extinguish 
base human instincts, believed that democracies could avoid 
wars and that a peaceful world could encourage democracies.1 
I suspect that in the 1940s and 1950s, when Morgenthau's 
ideas first received widespread attention, both some of his 
appeal and some of the objection to his arguments stemmed 
from his darker, more European view of world politics.2 
Of course, most of what Morgenthau wrote for American 
audiences was written during the Cold War, and it was in this 
context that his writings proved so influential. It is an 
exaggeration with some truth to see American writings on 
international politics before World War II as preoccupied by 
legalism and American foreign policy in that era to have 
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neglected national power. To scholars, statesmen, and an 
informed public which believed that the USSR was a grave 
menace to American security and Western values, that an 
assertive American policy was necessary to cope with this 
threat, and that many American traditions were a hindrance in 
this new world, many of Morgenthau's arguments were both 
enlightening and useful. Of course, his influence should not be 
overestimated: the experience of Hitler was a greater sponsor 
of Realism than any written text could be. But people who 
were responding in what was for them an unprecedented way 
by actively participating in the balance of power were greatly 
comforted by the idea that their behavior was not only 
appropriate for the moment but was grounded in world 
history and the necessary conduct of nations. 
Morgenthau's stress on the centrality of the national interest 
was particularly important. Although many scholars- myself 
included- have felt it to be maddeningly vague, the concept 
was particularly important in the American context for what it 
denied: that states should follow either sub-national or 
supra-national interests. Both were highly tempting to Ameri- 
cans. Lacking a strong state and being a nation of immigrants, 
the United States often had trouble maintaining a foreign 
policy that was guided more by external than by internal 
factors. In the nineteenth century, Irish immigrants strongly 
opposed policies that could be seen as pro-British; isolationism 
was particularly strong in the middle west in part because of 
the large German population; after World War II Eastern 
European voters were adamant that their countries of origin 
not be sacrificed to the USSR. To the post-war foreign policy 
establishment, which saw itself as cosmopolitan and having 
risen above such parochialism, it was very useful to realize that 
concerns of segments of the population could legitimately be 
put aside in favor of the wider good. But not too wide a good; 
while the United Nations might develop into a real instrument 
of world order, the United States could not afford to rely on it 
or to seek the common benefit of mankind unless this also 
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served American interests. There was nothing cynical in this; 
countries would not thrive- and might not survive- if they 
were excessively idealistic or altruistic. This is not to say that 
the statesmen of the early Cold War years were more prone 
to see conflicts between what was good for their state and what 
was good for others than were those in other eras. 
Nevertheless, Realism's enjunction that states not seek to 
reshape the world was useful in both restraining some of the 
statesmen's wilder schemes and, more importantly, in giving 
them a language with which they could justify their policies to 
the American public. Of course there is an irony here: it can be 
argued that, in the end, the policy of containment did re-order 
world politics. 
As central to Morgenthau's analysis as the national interest 
was power. Indeed, for him the two were very closely related. 
Perhaps his most famous sentence is that "the main signpost 
that helps political realism to find its way through the 
landscape of international politics is the concept of interest 
defined in terms of power" (Morgenthau, 1978, p. 5). Despite 
the importance of the concept of power to him, he never 
analyzed it with the care and sophistication it deserved, 
however. The discussion in Politics Among Nations is not much 
different han that which could be found in less important 
textbooks. While he noted some of the obvious sources of 
national power, he never discussed many of the less obvious 
aspects of power to which modern political science has devoted 
much- but perhaps not enough- attention.3 Even by the time 
Morgenthau started writing, Carl Friedrich had made the 
important point that power was often reflected in anticipated 
reactions- that is, an actor who apparently got his way may not 
have been powerful but may have been tailoring his demands 
to what he thought others were willing to give (Friedrich, 1937, 
pp. 589-91). The crucial need to separate the resources that 
might contribute to power from the notion of power itself was 
also established relatively early. It was crucial to an under- 
standing of power to see that it was highly relational and 
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context-bound and so was not readily fungible. An actor could 
have power over another in a particular area without being 
able to sway others on that question or influence the same 
actor on different issues. Indeed, this crucial fact helps explain 
why the concept of power could not serve the same function as 
the concept of money in the economy, thereby preventing the 
discipline of political science from following its sister discipline 
in fruitfully developing very abstract models. Although this 
was a conclusion with which Morgenthau strongly agreed, his 
failure to deeply explore the concept of power robbed some of 
his arguments of much of their force. 
To say that the national interest must be defined in terms of 
power does not say exactly what it is. Morgenthau's conception 
of Realism in fact does not lead to specific policy prescriptions 
or detailed propositions for empirical research.4 While it may 
be possible to condemn a particularly egregious policy as 
diminishing a nation's power, a wide range of courses of action 
remain. This may disturb a statesman looking for more 
detailed guidance, but it did not upset Morgenthau, who 
realized that statesmanship could not be reduced to formulas. 
He sought a realism that would tell statesmen how to think and 
what factors to think about, not what specific conclusions to 
reach. Thus, it was quite possible for people who were equally 
true to the precepts of Realism to advocate diametrically 
opposing policies. An obvious example is American policy in 
Vietnam. Although Morgenthau not only disagreed with the 
American intervention but had trouble understanding how 
any sensible person could advocate it, in fact many of the 
arguments for the war could have been bolstered by footnotes 
to Politics Among Nations and among the policy's architects were 
people who had been figurative and literal students of 
Morgenthau. 
If the fact that Realist reasoning could reach contradictory 
conclusions was upsetting for statesmen who were looking for 
ambiguous guidance, the fact that Realism does not readily 
yield testable propositions has been a source of frustration for 
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political scientists who sought to make their discipline more of 
a science. Of course, this did not bother Morgenthau. For him, 
it made no sense to try to rigorously deduce propositions from 
fundamental axioms. This would have so oversimplified 
politics as to produce a caricature. Furthermore, itimplied the 
existence of one dominant value and vastly underestimated the 
role of contingency in politics. For Morgenthau, it was a 
philosophical error of the most fundamental kind to equate 
the practice and study of politics with science (Morgenthau, 
1946). Of course, Morgenthau felt that his views were based on 
and borne out by international history, but he never tried to 
develop tight links between his arguments and either specific 
incidents or an array of international events, as political 
scientists now do. He never seriously considered alternative 
explanations or tried to show how the course of international 
politics was incompatible with them and consistent with his 
views. 
It was this rejection of the essence of the scientific method 
that caused many later scholars to feel that however 
well-founded his premises and however wise his insights, there 
were grave limitations to the utility of his approach. To go 
further, it was argued, much more rigor was called for; 
scholars had to develop theories of international politics from 
which they could deduce testable propositions. The founda- 
tions for the study of international politics had to be driven 
deeper into bedrock by first finding principles of human 
behavior; upon this one could build a structure that was more 
consistent and more ambitious than was possible using 
Morgenthau's more intuitive framework (Waltz, 1990). Thus, 
the most influential current theory (Waltz's Neorealism) shares 
many of Morgenthau's basic premises but proceeds with 
greater rigor (Waltz, 1979). Like Morgenthau, Waltz and those 
who have followed him stress the importance of power and the 
national interest and put to one side variations in domestic 
politics and societies and decision-makers' beliefs and values. 
Explicitly for these theorists and implicitly for Morgenthau, 
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the reason for this focus is the assumption that the 
international environment exerts sufficient compulsion on its 
members o that their behavior usually will be only marginally 
affected by their internal characteristics. The power of these 
theories has permitted scholars to draw from them many 
important propositions and to point to new areas that can be 
fruitfully explored. The price of this parsimonious theorizing, 
however, is to omit a range of factors that Morgenthau felt 
were vital- for example, the multiplicity of goals that states can 
seek, the role of morality, and statesmanship itself. Thus, many 
of those who criticize Waltz and Neorealism have come to 
more deeply appreciate Morgenthau's approach. 
But both Morgenthau's approach and Neorealism share one 
important and troublesome attribute: they are descriptive and 
prescriptive. That is, implicitly or explicitly they simulta- 
neously seek to explain how states do behave and to point out 
how states should behave. While this dual mission is not 
illegitimate, it raises two related analytical problems. First, it is 
a bit anomalous to be telling statesmen that they must follow 
the inevitable laws of international politics. Since the laws 
describe how statesmen must behave, at least in general 
outline, it makes as little sense to instruct hem as it does to tell 
leaves to appear in the spring and fade in the autumn. In fact, 
Morgenthau seemed particularly impatient with American 
statesmen, who he thought were especially prone to fail to 
conform to the laws he had discerned. Second, failings are not 
only those of individuals tates and statesmen but of the theory 
as well. When statesmen disregard the laws or, to use language 
in current use, behave sub-optimally, the theory would seem to 
be disconfirmed. Thus, American behavior in Vietnam posed 
real problems for Morgenthau and Waltz. They believed the 
policy to be inconsistent with the way their theories led them to 
think states should and did behave.5 Morgenthau did not 
explicitly try to explain the contradiction between misguided 
American policy and his arguments but implied that the gap 
was further evidence of human irrationality. Waltz confronted 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 05 Mar 2015 17:12:32 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
860 SOCIAL RESEARCH 
the question more directly and incorporated the aberrant 
behavior into his theory in the form of an argument about the 
tendency of states to "overreact" to conflicts in the peripheries 
of a bipolar world. This claim does not fit well with the 
structure of the rest of his argument, however.6 So what 
Morgenthau and Waltz make inadvertently clear is that it is 
difficult o develop an argument that both explains and 
prescribes. 
Unusual Elements in Morgenthau' s Realism 
Although Morgenthau inspired many scholars to develop his 
ideas of power, the national interest, and the international 
system into a more rigorous and parsimonious theory, it would 
be a great mistake to neglect the elements in Morgenthau's 
analysis that do not fit this tidy analysis. Indeed, it is the very 
presence of complicating and unruly factors that defined 
politics for Morgenthau. It was largely because of them that he 
felt that science- in his conception of it- could only be 
misleading when applied to the understanding or practice of 
this realm (and it is partly the willingness to put these areas 
aside that enables others to pursue a more scientific approach). 
Particularly important are Morgenthau's emphasis on ideas, 
morality, and diplomacy. 
Ideas 
The question of the relative importance of ideas and 
material interests, or, more usefully, the interrelationships 
between the two, have been central to social science from the 
beginning. In the post-war era, American scholars of security 
studies have been particularly concerned with this question, 
examining the roles of military doctrine, statesmen's theories 
of conflict (especially deterrence versus the spiral model of 
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conflict), beliefs about whether offense or defense has the 
advantage, and images of other states.7 Using a cognitive 
approach to the study of foreign policy, scholars have 
examined how beliefs and perceptions form, change, and both 
affect and are affected by behavior.8 More recently, students of 
international political economy have come to realize that a 
purely materialist approach is inadequate (Goldstein and 
Keohane, 1993).9 
Many studies begin with a ritual assertion that Realism, 
being deeply rooted in unchanging material interests, ignores 
the role of ideas. Perhaps such a Realist model could be 
developed, and in places Waltz's approach comes close to this, 
but it is foreign to Morgenthau's analysis. For all his stress on 
the importance of the national interest, which he often implied 
was objective, he clearly saw that statesmen can conceive of 
their interests in quite different ways, are moved by deep 
psychological forces, need to develop intellectual constructs to 
make sense of their world, and often are prisoners of 
inaccurate or inappropriate beliefs. 
Indeed, an understanding of the power of ideas is closely 
related to the description/prescription tension in Morgenthau's 
thought. The prescriptive element in his scholarly writings, not 
to speak of his frequent essays on current policies, would be 
pointless if he did not think both that people might be 
persuaded by them and that changing people's ideas would 
lead to changes in foreign policy. His whole discussion of the 
importance of power and the national interest was designed to 
establish in the American mind the view that he believed was 
proper and which I infer he thought was literally foreign to the 
traditional American approach to foreign policy. 
Let me just take two other examples of his concern with 
statesmen's beliefs, one quite specific and the other general. To 
start with the former, Morgenthau believed that American 
security policy in the Cold War was badly flawed by the 
tendency to examine nuclear weapons within the conceptual 
framework that was appropriate for conventional weapons 
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(Morgenthau, 1964, 1976). Because they render meaningful 
military victory impossible, nuclear weapons fundamentally 
alter the traditional relationship between force and foreign 
policy. When victory was possible, arms races and the quest for 
military superiority made sense. But as long as both sides have 
second strike capability (that is, can destroy the other side even 
if the other launches a surprise attack), the only way to prevent 
a nuclear war from devastating both sides would be to agree on 
rules that would limit the conflict. The destructive power of 
the weapons, the difficulties of wartime communication, and 
the hold of human emotions would make such limits 
impossible, however. Thus, mutual vulnerability has created 
dilemmas which traditional military strategy, far from being 
able to solve, only serves to compound. 
Trapped as they were in pre-nuclear ways of thinking, many 
analysts and decision-makers pursued traditional solutions 
such as nuclear superiority and the development of complex 
war plans. At bottom, this approach constituted a failure to 
accept the realities of mutual vulnerability and mutual 
deterrence. Although I would fault Morgenthau for not fully 
appreciating the arguments with which he disagreed or 
probing the intellectual, institutional, and political reasons for 
the American stance- which was generally paralleled by Soviet 
policy- I think that his insight was acute and indeed relied 
heavily upon it in my two books on nuclear strategy (Jervis, 
1984, 1989). Without arguing that American defense policy 
was founded simply on an intellectual error, that the dispute 
was entirely amenable to empirical evidence and careful 
reasoning, or that we can ever forget to ask who is advantaged 
and who is disadvantaged in domestic and bureaucratic politics 
by the success of alternative views, I think that Morgenthau 
was correct to argue that one cannot understand the policy 
alternatives or international outcomes without grasping the 
content, origins, and implications of alternative views about 
how nuclear weapons affect world politics. 
Even more at odds with the stereotype of Realism is 
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Morgenthau's two-fold argument that people's beliefs about 
the world are deeply affected by their past political struggles 
and that they are prone to fail to understand this. Central to 
his attack on Liberalism's exaggerated faith in the power of 
reason and the associated attempt to reduce politics to science 
is his view that knowledge is contingent, depending on the 
conditions and interests which lead people to hold it. Those 
who believe that all realists conceive of knowledge as 
independent from experience and self-interest, who think that 
they have made a fundamental discovery when they argue that 
people's sense of their social world is in significant measure 
socially constructed, and who think that they are the first to 
grasp the close interconnections between power and knowl- 
edge have never read Scientific Man Versus Power Politics. In a 
penetrating and lucid analysis, Morgenthau shows that much 
of modern Liberalism fails to understand the contingent 
nature of its own knowledge. The person who argues that 
scientific reasoning allows him to fully understand politics is in 
fact a "true dogmatist who universalizes cognitive principles of 
limited validity and applies them to realms not accessible to 
them" (Morgenthau, 1946, p. 220). 
The scientific ideas of modern Liberalism as applied to 
politics grew out of the struggle of the emerging middle class 
against feudalism, aristocracy, and arbitrary rule. This was 
both understandable and in many senses admirable. The 
problem, however, lies in the inevitable tendency of the human 
mind to endow with inherent legitimacy and value the ways of 
thinking and substantive ideas that served people well in 
reaching specified ends. Thus, "Liberalism deduced from the 
limited experience of a certain age universal aws which were 
found wanting when applied to conditions different from 
those under which they were originally developed" (Mor- 
genthau, 1946, p. 85). People both universalize their ideas and 
abstract hem from the interests which played a large part in 
shaping them: the "claim to universality, however, is actually 
detrimental to [the] scientific laim, since it obliterates the 
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social and moral determination by which all social science is 
qualified" (Morgenthau, 1946, p. 167). "In the social sciences, 
the social conditions determine not only the ulterior purpose 
but also the object of inquiry, the investigator's relation to it, 
his assumptions, methods, and immediate aims. ... In all 
societies certain results are beyond the reach of scientific 
inquiry ..." (Morgenthau, 1946, p. 162). I do not know 
whether it is more striking that Morgenthau failed to 
acknowledge that others, especially Karl Manheim and E.H. 
Carr, had made parallel arguments and neglected to fully 
develop this important line of reasoning in his later work, or 
that both scholars who sought to develop Realism and those 
who sought to attack it have neglected his analysis. 
While Morgenthau's discussion is grounded in his attack on 
the over-reliance on science and reason in politics, the thrust of 
his position goes further. Consistent with modern psychology, 
he sees that beliefs cannot be explained purely by "cold 
cognition" and instead are influenced by emotion, interest, and 
self-image. In a way strikingly parallel to the classic study of 
Opinions and Personality, which asks "of what use to a man is his 
opinions?" (Smith, Bruner, and White, 1956), Morgenthau 
sees that 
reason is like a light which by its own inner force can move 
nowhere. It must be carried in order to move. It is carried by the 
irrational forces of interest and emotion to where these forces 
want it to move. . . . [Because] even though man is dominated by 
interests and driven by emotional impulses, as well as motivated 
by reason, he likes to see himself primarily in the light of this 
latter, eminently human quality. Hence, he gives his irrational 
qualities the earmarks of reason. What we call 'ideology' is the 
result of this process of rationalization (Morgenthau, 1946, p. 
155). 
More recent studies of foreign policy have also explored the 
extent to which emotional and political needs determine 
perceptions of other actors and expectations of the chances of 
success of alternative courses of action.10 This line of research 
This content downloaded from 128.59.161.126 on Thu, 05 Mar 2015 17:12:32 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
HANS MORGENTHAU 865 
raises the question of the conditions under which and the 
extent to which ideas and beliefs are a function of the person's 
interests- that is, are superstructure, to use the Marxist 
terminology. Morgenthau does not venture an answer, which 
is understandable given the difficulty of the question; his 
successors have not done much better. But one should at least 
note the tension between his insight that beliefs about world 
politics are contingent and his central tenet: 
political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is 
governed by objective laws. ... It believes also ... in the 
possibility of distinguishing in politics between a truth and 
opinion- between what is true objectively and rationally, 
supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is 
only a subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are 
and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking (Morgenthau, 
1978, p. 4). 
In his view that ideas are deeply colored by parochial 
experience and self-interest, Morgenthau sees that powerful 
states, even- if not especially- when they are liberal democra- 
cies satisfied with the status quo, will often not only say but 
actually believe that their policies are in the best interests of the 
entire community of nations. Although a bit less explicit and 
biting in this regard than E.H. Carr (1939), Morgenthau 
realizes that human beings do not want to recognize the limits 
of their own perspectives or the powerful drives of their 
selfishness. Thus, states are often highly moralistic and, by 
coming to believe that they are doing good for others as well as 
themselves, do more evil than was necessary. Liberal democra- 
cies suffer the further disability of universalizing the ways in 
which they overcame tyranny and aristocracy at home. Liberals 
equate the distinction between war and peace to the one between 
aristocratic violence and liberal rationality. Thus Liberalism 
detached the specific techniques it had developed as instruments 
of its domestic domination, such as legal pledges, judicial 
machinery, economic transformations, from their political substratum and transferred them as self-sufficient ities, 
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devoid of their original political functions, tothe international 
sphere (Morgenthau, 1946, pp. 50-1). 
There is much to Morgenthau's analysis, especially the 
fundamental truth that politicians, like people in their 
everyday lives, are slow to appreciate the context in which their 
moral values as well as their empirical beliefs are valid and are 
quick to extend into one sphere the truths that are derived 
from another. Interestingly enough, Louis Hartz similarly saw 
the fundamental importance of the struggle against feudalism 
in shaping political thought, but did so in the context of 
explaining why Americans had such a different understanding 
of politics from Europeans: the former were "born equal"- 
American society was founded by a middle-class fragment, 
never underwent a bourgeois revolution against feudalism, 
and so never developed either strong reactionary or strong 
socialist strains of thinking (Hartz, 1955). n Indeed, Hartz 
explains the American inability to understand many other 
societies, its pathological fear of revolutions, and its paranoid 
anti-communism by the ideology that grew out of the very 
absence of a struggle against feudalism that Morgenthau sees 
as responsible for the over-reasoned and overly scientific 
perspective of Western nations that has caused foreign policy 
debacles. The irony, of course, is that Morgenthau sees the 
United States as the prime example of what he is describing, 
yet Hartz shows that America is distinct from Europe in 
lacking the experience of feudalism and the middle class's 
overthrow of it. 
Although this summary cannot do full justice to Mor- 
genthau's arguments, I hope I have said enough to show that 
in his understanding that being powerful can lead people to 
believe that their views are true and benefit others as well as 
themselves, and in the tension he portrays (without resolving) 
between interests and ideas, Morgenthau is a much more 
complex Realist than most current discussions either of 
Morgenthau or of these subjects would lead us to believe. 
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Morality 
In his conception of the role of morality in international 
politics, Morgenthau again diverges from what most people 
associate with Realism; many scholars who argue that morality 
plays a significant role in foreign policy contrast their views 
with what they take to be Morgenthau's without understanding 
the latter.12 It is always good for authors to find someone to 
disagree with- and there is much to disagree with in 
Morgenthau's analysis- but it simply will not do to use selected 
quotations to show that Morgenthau thought that international 
politics leaves no room for ethical considerations. Indeed, at 
one point Morgenthau quotes Cavour's famous remark: "If we 
had done for ourselves what we did for Italy, what scoundrels 
we would have been!" (Morgenthau, 1946, p. 179). 
Those who tell the standard tale of Morgenthau and Realism 
would not be surprised; they would be surprised, however, at 
what Morgenthau says next: "No civilization can be satisfied 
with such a dual morality" (Morgenthau, 1946). Morgenthau's 
views of the relationship between expediency and morality are 
not simple, and I do not think they are entirely consistent. But 
it is clear that he believes that morality does and must play a 
large role in the selection of national means and goals. "In 
order to be worthy of our lasting sympathy, a nation must 
pursue its interests for the sake of a transcendent purpose that 
gives meaning to the day-to-day operations of its foreign 
policy" (Morgenthau, 1960, p. 8). Morality can be destructive 
when statesmen use it to identify the good of the world with 
the good of their state, if not of themselves personally. 
Properly conceived, however, morality provides a check on this 
tendency: 
Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a 
particular nation with the moral aws that govern the universe. . . . The lighthearted quation between a particular nationalism and the counsels of Providence ismorally indefensible, for it is that very sin of pride against which the Greek tragedians and the 
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Biblical prophets have warned rulers and ruled. The equation is 
also politically pernicious, for it is liable to engender the 
distortion i  judgment which, in the blindness of crusading 
frenzy, destroys nations and civilizations (Morgenthau, 1978, p. 
11). 
More than is true for later scholars, Morgenthau traces 
much of the source of the necessary evil in politics to human 
nature and "the animus dominarteli, the desire for power" 
(Morgenthau, 1946, p. 192). Pure selfishness and the desire to 
gratify basic human needs, such as shelter, food, and security, 
would only produce some of the conflict we see in our social 
world because those impulses can often be gratified through 
cooperation on the basis of mutual respect and equality. "The 
desire for power, on the other hand, concerns itself not with 
the individual's urvival but with his position among his fellows 
once his survival has been secured. Consequently, the 
selfishness of man has limits: his will to power has none" 
(Morgenthau, 1946, p. 193). 13 Although the desire to 
dominate plays a role in all aspects of human life, in politics it 
is "the very life-blood of the action, the constitutive principle of 
politics as a distinct sphere of human activity" (Morgenthau, 
1946, p. 195). This does not mean that there is no room for 
morality, but that if it is to be meaningful and effective, itmust 
take account of the demanding realm in which it operates. 
For Morgenthau, the rules of morality are not simple, in 
part because the importance of power in international politics 
means that judgments must be rendered in particular contexts, 
thus prohibiting the abstractions that could otherwise guide 
policy. Indeed, a danger second only to universalizing one's 
interests and perspectives is to apply general principles without 
paying attention to the context in which they will work 
themselves out. Thus, inter-war Western statesmen who were 
seeking to build international politics on enlightened principles 
of justice "were intellectually and morally unable to resist 
German expansion as long as it appeared to be justified- as in 
the cases of Austria and the Sudetenland- by the holy 
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principles of national unification" (Morgenthau, 1946, p. 54). 
Properly conceived, morality seeks to both further the state's 
legitimate interests and respect those of others. It searches for 
common ground without yielding what the state needs to 
protect itself. This search is not likely to succeed if states have 
wildly different conceptions of right and justice. Thus, for 
Morgenthau a degree of moral consensus among nations is a 
prerequisite for a well functioning international order. In 
contrast to more recent analysts like Waltz (and myself), 
Morgenthau argues that the balance of power arose not only 
out of the clash of competing self-interests but out of a 
common culture, respect for other's rights, and agreement on 
basic moral principles (Morgenthau, 1978, pp. 221-28; Waltz, 
1979; Jervis, forthcoming, eh. 4).14 
While Morgenthau is maddeningly elusive about exactly what 
morality requires and the relationship between morality and pru- 
dence, he is clear that despite the crucial role for morality in 
politics, there will always be tension between the imperatives of 
power and those of morality, and, for this reason, statesmen 
cannot seek to behave morally in the sense of doing as much 
good for as many people as possible. "There is no escape from 
the evil of power, regardless of what one does. . . . Political ethics 
is indeed the ethics of doing evil. While it condemns politics as 
the domain of evil par excellence, it must reconcile itself to the 
enduring presence of evil in all political action. Its last resort, 
then, is the endeavor to choose, since evil there must be, among 
several possible actions the one that is least evil" (Morgenthau, 
1946, pp. 201-2). I think as important as the willingness to face 
the necessity to do evil is Morgenthau's stress that indeed there 
is choice. Taken to its extreme, Realism argues that because in- 
ternational politics lacks government, the international environ- 
ment is so hostile that states have little room to maneuver: they 
are in the realm of compulsion, not choice. But Morgenthau, like 
his fellow distinguished Realist Arnold Wolfers, realizes that while 
this is in fact sometimes the case, statesmen rarely are entirely the 
prisoner of forces beyond their own control (Wolfers, 1962). 
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Diplomacy 
Since Morgenthau sees a large role for statesmen and states- 
manship, it is not surprising that he also stresses the importance 
of diplomacy. But this too contrasts with the standard view of 
Realism as describing and prescribing expansion of control if not 
of territory, stiff-necked refusal to compromise, and constant 
threats. But Morgenthau devotes the final chapters of Politics 
Among Nations to diplomacy and includes as its only appendix the 
Charter of the United Nations. Realism, at least for Morgenthau, 
implies not only that states must guard their power stakes, but 
that they must also compromise and trim their objectives to what 
is feasible. Force and war can never be dismissed from interna- 
tional politics, but in a prudent policy, they usually remain in the 
background. Morgenthau's rules of diplomacy may seem com- 
mon sense, but those who know Morgenthau by standard sum- 
maries of him may be surprised by them: "Diplomacy must be 
divested of the crusading spirit"; "Diplomacy must look at the 
political scene from the point of view of other nations"; "Nations 
must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to 
them"; "Never put yourself in a position from which you cannot 
retreat without losing face and from which you cannot advance 
without grave risks"; "Never allow a weak ally to make decisions 
for you"; "The armed forces are the instruments of foreign pol- 
icy, not its master" (Morgenthau, 1978, pp. 550-58). 
Partly because of the influence of the Cold War, a great deal 
of the study of international politics over the past two decades 
has focused on bargaining. Of course, this process inevitably 
involves common as well as conflicting interests (Schelling, 
1960), but, nevertheless, the emphasis has been on how states 
seek to get as much as possible, primarily by the use of threats. 
As Morgenthau shows, this view is not incorrect, but it is 
incomplete. Much of international politics consists of a mutual 
adjustment of interests, and this involves not only exerting 
one's will over others but understanding what others want and 
why they want it. The protracted and patient interaction with 
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others, the exploration of alternative solutions, the accommo- 
dation of what others need constitutes the essence of 
day-to-day diplomacy which, if successful, does not produce 
those dramatic lashes which have so preoccupied scholars and 
given them a distorted view of how international politics does 
and should function. 
Realism, Peace, and Domestic Politics 
Toward the end of his career, Morgenthau modified if not 
renounced some of the important elements of his approach on 
the grounds that changes in the world had rendered them 
inappropriate. The existence of huge stockpiles of nuclear 
weapons meant that superpower war was no longer a viable 
tool of statecraft (Morgenthau, 1964). Increasing economic 
interdependence had drawn the developed states closer 
together, increasing the benefits of peace and the costs of 
severed relationships (Morgenthau, 1975). This analysis was 
accurate and important; with the benefit of hindsight, I would 
argue that Morgenthau did not go far enough, did not see the 
extent to which international politics among the developed 
states15 was being transformed radically not only because of 
changes in the costs and benefits of war and peace but because 
of changes in values and the propensity of democracies to 
cooperate with each other. Morgenthau denied the possibility 
of the former change or the efficacy of the latter. His stress on 
the role of malign human nature on the one hand and the 
powerful role of the international environment on the other 
left little room for values and domestic regimes. But if human 
beings have not changed, significant elements of the value 
system in developed democracies have. The triumph of 
bourgeois democracy may not be the end of history, but 
concern for honor, preoccupation with position for its own 
sake rather than for national well-being, and the drive for 
national dominance are greatly reduced.16 
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Morgenthau would have trouble with this conclusion. He re- 
served some of his sharpest comments for those who believed 
that democracies were fundamentally different, hat they could 
extend the norms and values upon which they were constructed 
to the international rena. Indeed, Woodrow Wilson and his 
followers represent for Morgenthau much that was wrong- 
headed about foreign policy in the twentieth century. Most re- 
alists agreed; states were like "billiard balls" in that their internal 
differences were inconsequential and their behavior determined 
only by their reactions to one another.17 But while it is true that 
democracies are not less willing to fight than are other forms of 
government, hey rarely if ever fight each other.18 Although it is 
all too easy to imagine the frail democracies in the former USSR 
and Eastern Europe going to war with each other, regimes that 
are not only subject to the will of their peoples but also have 
stable and well-established institutions are very likely to remain 
at peace with each other and to cooperate more readily than is 
true for autocracies or revolutionary regimes. The individual- 
ism, faith in reason, and willingness to compromise that Mor- 
genthau had seen as undermining democracies' ability to con- 
duct world politics in a world of hostile states may in fact produce 
the desired and expected results when they are shared among all 
the major powers. The expectation that just regimes would even- 
tually triumph and that states could not remain strong if they 
oppressed their people seemed naive to most realists (myself 
included). But it may have sustained popular support for West- 
ern foreign policies during the Cold War and helped bring about 
what Morgenthau and so many others thought was impossible: a 
world in which the most powerful states in the system no longer 
menace each other. 
Notes 
1 There seems to be more than a bit of truth in these propositions, 
as I will discuss later. 
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2 The classic contrast between Anglo-American international 
thought on the one hand and that of Continental Europe on the 
other is Wolfers, 1962, ch. 15. 3 The most complete treatment, with special reference to 
international politics, is Baldwin, 1989. 4 He makes the former point clear in Morgenthau, 1958, pp. 
75-81. 
5 It is possible, of course, for a scholar's policy preferences to 
shape his theories and indeed this may have been true for some of 
Waltz's arguments. 
6 For further discussion, see Jervis, forthcoming, ch. 3. 7 See, for example, Snyder, 1984; Posen, 1984; Schelling, 1960, 
ch. 9; Spiegel, 1985. 8 The literature isvoluminous: important works include Wohlstet- 
ter, 1962; Holsti, 1967, ch. 2; Jervis, 1976; Larson, 1985; Jervis, 
Lebow, and Stein, 1985. 9 For an earlier study along these lines, see Odell, 1982. 10 See, for example, Janis and Mann, 1977; Cottam, 1977; Lebow, 
1981; Tervis, Lebow, and Stein, 1985; Wark, 1985. 1 1 This book is perhaps the most important and surely one of the 
most controversial in the study of American politics and society. 12 See, for example, Lumsdaine, 1993, ch. 1. 13 Much recent scholarship has concerned the conditions under 
which states pursue relative rather than absolute gains: Baldwin, 
1993. 
14 More recently, Paul Schroeder (1994) has developed in rich 
detail a view that is similar to Morgenthau's. 15 This qualification is important; international politics in the rest 
of the world bears much greater resemblance to traditional patterns. 16 For further discussion, see, for example, Mueller, 1989; Jervis, 
1991/92; Tervis, 1993. 17 The analogy comes from Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration. 
Waltz's powerful theory is built in large measure on denying the 
relevance of domestic differences for the basic patterns of 
international politics (Theory of International Politics), although he sees 
their role in setting the details of policy (Waltz, 1967). 
The evidence and literature is well summarized in Russe tt, 1993. 
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